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PAY-TO-PLAY: MCCUTCHEON V. FEC’S ROBUST EFFECT ON FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONTRACTOR CONTRIBUTION REGULATIONS 
 
Tyler C. Stearns  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 2, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued the opinion in McCutcheon v. 
FEC.1 McCutcheon was among a series of cases involving campaign finance regulations which 
came into public consciousness following the well-publicized 2012 decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC.2 McCutcheon involved a challenge to portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(“FECA”), specifically the portion of FECA that imposes aggregate limits on the amount of money 
individuals may contribute to candidates and parties in federal elections.3 The McCutcheon 
plaintiffs argued that the aggregate limits violated their right to make political contributions, a right 
protected by the First Amendment.4 Prior to the McCutcheon, decision, the aggregate limits 
imposed a $123,200 per election cycle limit on the total amount of money individuals may 
contribute to all federal elective candidates.5 The question presented to the Court in McCutcheon 
was whether the aggregate limits of FECA were valid under the First Amendment. The Court’s 
answer to this question undermines over thirty years of campaign finance regulation and 
jurisprudence; and arguably will have serious ramifications on influence of political contributions 
in federal and state elections.  
Announcing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts reinforced that a citizen’s right 
to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment.6 
                                                          
1 http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/McCutcheon.shtml. 
2 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1436 (2014). 
3 Id. 
4 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 
5 See infra, Part III.  
6 McCutcheon at 1436.  
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However, the Chief Justice emphasized that this “right is not absolute, and Congress may impose 
certain limitations.”7 The Court’s holding reasoned that the aggregate contribution limits were 
unconstitutional; stating that limits to political contributions are valid only if their purpose is to 
prevent quid pro quo corruption (or its appearance), and the regulation is closely drawn to meet 
that purpose.8 Following the Court’s decision, individuals can contribute money to any federal 
candidate within the base limits set forth in FECA.9 Consequently, following the McCutcheon 
decision, an individual could theoretically donate in excess of $1.5 million dollars per election 
cycle.10 For context, in 2010 Democrats and Republicans raised $1.5 billion for Congressional 
races.11 Thus, if the aggregate limits were struck down prior to the 2010 election, 429 individuals 
contributing the approximate $1.5 million, maximum could have theoretically funded every 
winning Congressional candidate.12  
The previous example, while not representing fact or likely reality following the 
McCutcheon decision, it exposes the potential serious implications of the Supreme Court’s 
decision. Those implications extend beyond the validity of the aggregate contribution limits in 
FECA and other regulations.13 Outside of the increased dollar amounts stemming from the 
McCutcheon decision, the Court’s refined analysis of permissible campaign finance regulations, 
which address quid pro quo corruption, raises questions as to the validity of “pay-to-play” 
regulations or regulations addressing contributions by government contractors. Pay-to-play 
regulations are designed to prevent individuals or companies contracting with the government 
                                                          
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 See infra, Part II (discussing the Court’s reasoning in upholding the base limits and delimiting the permissible 
amounts an individual may contribute to candidates and parties).  
10 See infra, Part V.  
11 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relating to Contributions and Expenditures 
Intended to Affect Elections, 113 S. Rpt. 223, 21. 
12 Id.  
13 See infra, Part II. 
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from using monetary contributions to influence the award of future contracts and exert increased 
political influence. This Note argues that the McCutcheon decision will have far reaching, 
detrimental effects on campaign finance regulations, specifically focusing on pay-to-play 
regulations.  
This Note begins by examining the breadth of the protections the First Amendment 
provides to political contributions14 Part I sets out the background and history of federal 
jurisprudence with respect to regulation of political contributions. Part II focuses on the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of political contribution regulations in McCutcheon. Part III discusses and reviews 
prior state and federal pay-to-play regulations by applying the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
McCutcheon. Part IV discusses the effect of campaign contributions on federal contract awards 
and how the McCutcheon decision implicates federal contractor contributions. Furthermore, Part 
V applies the McCutcheon decision to the federal and state pay-to-play regulations, and concludes 
that the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon may invalidate or force reformation of federal and state pay-
to-play regulations. Part VI analyzes the practical implications of the McCutcheon decision on 
campaign financing.  
II: HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION — BUCKLEY V. VALEO 
“No enemy of free government [is] more dangerous and none so insidious” as 
contributions by corporations for political reasons.15  
– President Theodore Roosevelt 
 
Addressing Congress in 1904, President Roosevelt underscored the threat of corruption 
arising from political contributions, calling for “vigorous measures to eradicate” perceived 
                                                          
14 See infra, Part III. 
15 Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, Fourth Annual Message to the Senate and House of 
Representatives, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545. 
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political corruption.16 In his address, the President emphasized Congress’s role in addressing 
political corruption, stating:  
[i]t is accepted that Congress has power under the Constitution to regulate the 
election of federal officers, including the President and the Vice President.17 This 
includes the authority to protect the elective processes against the ‘two great natural 
and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption.’18  
 
In his annual address to Congress in December 1905, President Roosevelt echoed his previous 
calls for campaign finance regulations stating, “all contributions by corporations to any political 
committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be 
permitted to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind 
would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices 
acts.”19 Again in 1906, President Roosevelt urged Congress to enact “a law prohibiting 
corporations from contributing to the campaign expenses of any party.”20 Congress responded in 
1907 by enacting the Tillman Act, the first campaign finance law addressing political 
contributions.21 The Tillman Act made it unlawful for national banks or corporations to contribute 
money to federal campaigns and opened the door for Congress to take a more pragmatic approach 
to campaign finance regulation.22 Following the Tillman Act, Congress passed additional 
campaign finance reforms including, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the Hatch Act of 
1939, the Smith-Connally Act of 1943, and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.23 Each of these 
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
18 Buckley at 257 (quoting, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884)) (emphasis added).  
19 Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law xvii (1988). 
20 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 509 (quoting 41 Cong. Rec. 22 (1906)). 
21 See Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A brief-ish history of campaign finance 
reform, WASHINGTON POST, April 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/03/a-history-
of-campaign-finance-reform-from-george-washington-to-shaun-mccutcheon/. 
22 Fed. Election Comm’n, Appendix 4: The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History (accessed April 1, 
2015), available at http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm. 
23 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (imposing disclosure requirements on House, Senate and 
primary candidates; requiring reporting of contributions over $100, and raising Senate expenditure limits to 
$25,000); Hatch Act of 1939, 5 U.S.C. 7321-7326 (empowering Congress to regulate primary elections and included 
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regulations was crafted with the goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, 
which arises from monetary contributions by individuals made in exchange for political 
influence.24 However, between 1947 and 1971, Congress took little if any action to curb the 
growing influence of money in politics and did little to enforce the pre-existing regulations passed 
between 1907 and 1947.25 Notably, following Richard Nixon’s election in 1969, the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives notified the Justice Department of twenty fund-raising Committees 
associated with now President Nixon that failed to file a single campaign finance disclosure 
report.26 The Justice Department responded the following year.27 In its response, the Justice 
Department announced that “none of the violators would be prosecuted . . . given the history of 
the act” and that enforcement would be unfair.28 In other words, the Justice Department decided 
that because they had not previously enforced campaign finance reporting obligations, individuals 
should not be punished for failing to abide by the reporting regulations.29 This Justice Department 
decision purportedly ended their passive approach to enforcement of campaign finance regulations 
as it declared future violators would be prosecuted.30 The failure of Congress to enact more 
stringent campaign finance regulations, combined with the Justice Department’s passive 
                                                          
limitations on contributions and expenditures in Congressional elections); Smith-Connally Act of 1943 (expanding 
the scope of the Tillman Act to include unions among the entities prohibited from contributing money to federal 
campaigns); Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. 80-101 (1947) (prohibiting corporations and unions from making independent 
expenditures in federal political campaigns).  
24 FEC, supra note 16.  
25 See Melvin I.Urofsky, A Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform: Past, Present, and Future: Article: Campaign 
Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 25-32 (discussing Congressional infighting during this 
period which prevented the passage of additional campaign finance reform).  
26 Id. at 32.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  




enforcement of the pre-existing regulations made it readily apparent that reform was necessary. 
Such reform emerged two years later with the passage Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.31  
FECA was a complete overhaul of federal campaign finance and election laws. FECA 
broadened reporting and disclosure requirements for political contributions, imposed limitations 
on contributions and expenditures, and created provisions for public financing of federal 
campaigns.32 In 1974, Congress passed amendments to FECA, including increased limitations on 
contributions and expenditures, and critically created the Federal Election Commission; an 
independent agency charged with regulation and enforcement of the federal election laws.33 
FECA’s wide-ranging reforms helped lift the veil on the use of money in political campaigns, but 
also raised questions as to constitutional implications of limitations on contributions and 
expenditures. In response to FECA and the 1974 Amendments, Senator James L. Buckley and 
Eugene McCarthy challenged the constitutionality of the contribution and expenditure limits, 
arguing that the regulations impermissibly abridged constitutionally protected First Amendment 
rights.34 Buckley and McCarthy’s challenge to FECA was the first time the Supreme Court was 
asked to evaluate the validity of contribution and expenditure limits and shaped future legislation 
and judicial review of campaign finance regulations.  
The expenditure and contribution limits in FECA implicated the First Amendment’s 
protection on political association and political expression.35 Discussing these rights in in NAACP 
v. Alabama36, the Court recognized that “effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
                                                          
31 See Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A brief-ish history of campaign finance 
reform, WASHINGTON POST, April 3, 2014 (explaining that FECA was amended in 1974 in response to the 
Watergate Scandal).  
32 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 258.  
33 Fed. Election Comm’n, Appendix 4: The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History (accessed April 1, 2-
15), available at http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm. 
34 Eugene McCarthy was a former Democratic Congressman and Senator from Minnesota. 
35 Buckley at 15.  
36 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”37 With 
political association and political expression in mind, the Buckley Court expressed that FECA’s 
contribution and expenditure limits operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment 
activities.38 Thus, because the contribution and expenditure limits implicate First Amendment 
rights, the first question considered by the Buckley Court’s review of the FECA regulations was to 
what extent the limits abridge First Amendment rights. 
The Court’s analysis distinguished the effect the base and aggregate limits had upon the 
exercise of First Amendment rights.39 FECA limited the permissible expenditures to a candidate 
to $1,000 per election.40 The Buckley Court stated that the $1,000 limit appeared to “exclude all 
citizens and groups, except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press” from 
substantial use of important methods of communications.41 The Court reasoned that this limitation 
on every citizens ability to exercise political speech inhibited political discussion and the quantity 
of political expression.42 Such limitations, the Court found, substantially controlled the quantity 
and diversity of political speech.43 Thus, because expenditure limits constrain political discussion 
and expression, the Court found that such regulations are subject to “the exacting scrutiny 
applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights.”44 The Court explained that under 
exacting or strict scrutiny, the government may regulate expenditure limits only if the regulation 
promotes a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.45 
                                                          
37 Id. at 460.  
38 Buckley at 14. 
39 Id. at 14.  
40 18 U.S.C. § 608 (e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).  
41See Buckley, supra note 20 (noting that a full-page newspaper advertisement in 1975 cost $6,971.04, well above 
the $1,000 expenditure limit).  
42 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20.  
43 Id.  
44 Buckley at 44-45.  
45 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Notably, the Court’s review of contribution limits departed from the strict scrutiny standard 
applicable to the expenditure limits and led to a notably different conclusion respecting 
contribution regulations.46  
The Buckley Court reasoned that campaign contributions were a lesser restraint on 
protected First Amendment speech, and therefore contribution regulations should be subject to a 
different level of scrutiny.47 Under FECA, individuals and groups were permitted to contribute up 
to $1,000 per election and party committees were permitted to donate $5,000 to a single 
candidate.48 FECA further limited overall contributions by individuals and groups to all candidates 
to $25,000 per calendar year. 49Its analysis, the Court noted that, “a contribution serves as a general 
expression of support for the candidate’s views, but does not communicate the underlying basis 
for the support.”50According to the Court, the key difference was the communication aspect of the 
regulations. The Court reasoned that expenditures allow individuals to express in their own manner 
the reasons why they support a candidate, or the reasons they believe a candidate should be elected. 
Conversely, campaign contributions “permit the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a 
contribution”, but did not infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.”51 
This distinction led the Court to closely drawn scrutiny, a diminished yet “rigorous standard of 
review” to limitations on political contributions. 52  
To survive strict scrutiny, an expenditure limit regulation must show (1) a compelling 
government interest and (2) employ the “least restrictive means” necessary to achieve the 
                                                          
46 Buckley at 20-21. 
47 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1437.  
48 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(1)-(2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). 
49 18 U.S.C. § 608 (b)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). 
50 McCutcheon at 1437.  
51 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  
52 Buckley at 29. 
10 
 
compelling government interest.53 Comparatively, contribution limits are subject closely draw 
scrutiny, where “the State [must] demonstrate a sufficiently important interest and employs means 
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”54 Thus, the Buckley 
court created a critical distinction for contribution regulations in applying closely drawn scrutiny. 
This level of scrutiny allows Congress and legislatures greater leeway in enacting regulations 
limiting campaign contributions, by permitting these regulations to abridge upon First Amendment 
rights so long as they do not unnecessarily abridge associational freedom.55  
Another product of the Buckley decision was the Court’s finding that the prevention of quid 
pro quo corruption or its appearance qualifies as a sufficiently important government interest.56 
The Buckley court ultimately concludes that the campaign contribution regulations in FECA were 
valid because they employed means closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption, and that 
such regulations did not unnecessarily abridge associational freedoms.57 Future decisions helped 
solidify the Court’s conclusions regarding the campaign contributions as permissible to prevent 
quid pro quo corruption and are discussed hereafter.  
Additional support for base limits on contributions can be found in Nixon v. Shrink.58 Nixon 
involved a challenged to a Missouri state law that imposed limits on contributions by individuals 
to state office candidates to $275 and $1,075.59 Petitioners challenged the law, alleging that the 
contribution limits violated their First Amendment rights.60 The Court upheld the Missouri limits; 
applying closely drawn scrutiny in holding that there is “no reason in logic or evidence to doubt 
                                                          
53 See supra note 38. 
54 Buckley at 25 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)).  
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 528 U.S. 377 (2000).  
59 Nixon at 383.  
60 Id. (Petitioners’ Complaint did not specify what First Amendment rights were violated, however the Court 
postulated that the regulation implicated freedom of speech and freedom of association).  
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the sufficiency of Buckley to govern the Missouri case”.61 The Court in Nixon reemphasized the 
reasoning in Buckley that, ‘“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” was 
found to be a “constitutionally sufficient justification”’, and found authority for Missouri’s law 
and other state limits on contributions in the Buckley ruling.62  
Contribution limits withstood further scrutiny in McConnell v. FEC.63 McConnell involved 
a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).64 The BCRA codified 
prohibitions on soft money donations, or donations solicited to a party or committee instead of to 
a particular candidate.65 In McConnell, the Court upheld the soft money prohibitions despite 
petitioner’s arguments that there was no concrete evidence of real or apparent corruption.66 The 
Court reasoned that the soft money prohibitions prevented ‘undue influence on officeholders’ 
judgment, and the appearance of corruption.67 Critically, the McConnell court articulated that 
Congress’ interest in preventing quid quo pro corruption extends beyond “simple cash-for-votes 
corruption”.68 The Court concentrated on evidence of access in exchange for soft money donations 
in finding that the contribution bans were sufficient to conclude that the soft money donations in 
the BCRA were a valid exercise of Congress’ prevention of the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption.69  
The takeaway from the Court’s decision in Buckley and later contribution regulation 
decisions was that Congress may enact limitations on political contributions, subject to certain 
                                                          
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 379, 397- 98. 
63 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
64 116 Stat. 81.  
65 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (Supp.II)).  
66 McConnell at 153.  
67 Id. (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.431, 441).  
68 McConnell at 150-151. 
69 Id.  
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requirements.70 The court determined in Buckley that regulations related to political contributions 
must (1) have the goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and (2) the 
regulations must be closely drawn to meet that goal without unnecessarily abridging First 
Amendment or other constitutional freedoms.71 This reasoning is repeatedly relied upon and 
upheld in later decisions, and Congress and state legislatures have utilized these conclusions in 
drafting campaign finance laws.72 The contribution limits, while deemed valid by Buckley and 
cases challenging comparable contribution regulations, became the subject of further scrutiny 
thirty-five years later in McCutcheon. The Court’s decision in McCutcheon agreed with the 
“closely drawn” scrutiny standard from Buckley validating the base contribution limits, but 
disagreed with the Court’s conclusion in Buckley respecting aggregate limits on campaign 
contributions.73 The McCutcheon decision and revised analysis of aggregate contribution limits 
changed the outlook on aggregate contribution limits and brings into question the constitutionality 
of comparable regulations.  
PART III: MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
McCutcheon involved a challenge to the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) and § 
441a(a)(3).74 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) addresses base limit contributions any “person” may make to 
individual candidate and political committee, limiting individuals to contribute $5,200 to a 
candidate, $32,000 to a national party committee, $10,000 to a local or state party committee, and 
$5,000 to a political action committee.75 § 441a(a)(3) provides for aggregate contribution limits an 
                                                          
70 Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 at 39.  
71 Buckley at 39-59. 
72 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 235 (2006).  
73 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1437–40. 
74 McCutcheon at 1436. 
75 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1).  
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individual may make over a two year period to all candidates or committees.76 The aggregate 
contribution limit mandates that an individual may contribute up to $123,200 to candidate and 
non-candidate committees during a two-year election cycle.77 The plaintiffs in McCutcheon 
challenged the constitutionality of the aggregate limits regulated by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3), arguing 
that the aggregate limits are not closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption.78  
By way of background, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action, echoing Buckley in 
concluding that the aggregate limits in FECA survived First Amendment scrutiny because the 
Government had a legitimate interest in preventing “evasion of the base limits.”79 In part, the 
district court reached this finding after considering a hypothetical situation whereby a single donor 
could contribute to multiple committees and those committees could thereafter transfer the money 
to a single committee, thus combining the contributions to exceed the base limits.80 This purported 
loophole was foreseen as one example of how a donor may circumvent the base limits, and 
therefore justified the requirement for aggregate limits.81 The Supreme Court disagreed with the 
district court’s ruling.  
The Supreme Court’s analysis began by distinguishing between the “base limits” and the 
“aggregate limits.”82 Among the differences, the Court noted that the base limits are a restriction 
on the amount of money a donor may contribute to a specific candidate or committee.83 By 
comparison, the aggregate limits impose restrictions on the number of candidates a donor may 
contribute to, subject to the limitations of the base limits.84 The difference between quantity of 
                                                          
76 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3). 
77 Id.  
78 McCutcheon at 1442.  
79 Id.  
80 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (2012); see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 126 (2006).  
81 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1442. 
82 Id. at 1438–39.  
83 McCutcheon at 1448. 
84 Id. (emphasis added). 
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money an individual may contribute to a candidate and the quantity of candidates to whom an 
individual may contribute money became the critical distinction in the Court’s ruling.85 The issue 
facing the Court was whether a restriction upon the number of candidates a donor contributes to 
satisfy closely drawn scrutiny standard under Buckley.  
The Supreme Court concluded that when evaluating regulations which target political 
contributions such regulations are subject to closely drawn scrutiny, and must target “quid pro 
quo” corruption or its appearance.86 “Quid pro quo” corruption suggests the notion of a “direct 
exchange of an official act for money.”87 “The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: 
dollars for political favors.”88 In Buckley, the Court noted that the $25,000 aggregate limit imposed 
a restriction on the number of candidates and committees to whom an individual may contribute.89 
The Buckley Court considered the aggregate limits as modest restrictions on First Amendment 
speech and thereby permissible to prevent the appearance of quid pro quo corruption through 
circumvention of the base limits.90 The McCutcheon plurality disagreed with the validity of the 
latter conclusion emphasizing that “an aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees an 
individual may support . . . is not a ‘modest restraint’ at all.”91 The Court considered that absent a 
sufficient nexus between the political contribution regulation and prevention of quid pro quo 
corruption, such regulation would therefore be invalid for impermissibly restricting First 
                                                          
85 McCutcheon at 1463-64.  
86 McCutcheon at 1441, (citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359).  
87 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1466.  
88 Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)  
89 424 U.S. at 28. 
90 Id.  
91 McCutcheon at 1448.  
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Amendment speech. 92 The Court did not find a nexus between the aggregate limits and prevention 
of quid pro quo contributions.93  
The McCutcheon court reasoned that in simple terms the aggregate limits prohibit fully 
contributing to the campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if the contributions fall within the 
scope of the base limits.94 Congress, by codifying this limitation, sets forth that the aggregate limits 
prevent quid pro quo corruption that may stem from contributing to multiple candidates or party 
committees of the same party.95 The McCutcheon court, however, discerned that by creating the 
base limits, Congress demarcated the specific contribution amounts that raise an issue of quid pro 
quo corruption.96 The Court postulated that “spending large sums of money in connection with 
elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official 
duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption.”97 Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the 
argument that an individual who spends large sums may garner “influence over or access to” 
elected officials, raising the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.98  
The appearance of quid pro quo corruption, however, is applicable only to “the narrow 
category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder.”99 The 
Court noted funneling money to a particular candidate or party gives rise to quid pro quo corruption 
or its appearance and may be regulated.100 However, according to the McCutcheon court, 
contributing money to a party or candidate within the amounts specified in the base limits does not 
                                                          
92 Id.  
93 Id; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (where the Court found that evidence that soft money donations raised an 
appearance of political corruption was sufficient to uphold the regulations prohibiting same).  
94 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1448.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 McConnell at 310.  
100 McCutcheon at 1448. 
16 
 
rise to an inference of quid pro quo corruption, and thus may not be subject to broad restrictions 
such as the aggregate limits in FECA.101 In other words, the Court concluded that Congress, by 
codifying the base limits specified the amount of money which raises an inference of quid pro quo 
corruption. Thus, any contributions within the base limits are per se valid, and do not raise and 
inference of quid quo pro corruption. Absent a connection between aggregate limits and quid pro 
quo corruption, the Court reasoned that the aggregate limits are unconstitutional. Proponents for 
the regulations argued evidence of the appearance of quid pro quo corruption is difficult, if not 
impossible to find.102 In response, the Court noted that “the First Amendment requires us to err on 
the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”103 
As a result of the court’s analysis and conclusion respecting aggregate limits, undermines 
thirty-five years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and raises questions as to the validity of federal 
and state pay-to-play regulations. Prior to the McCutcheon decision, the Court declined to overrule 
Buckley in Randall v. Sorrell104. There, the Court emphasized that overruling Buckley would 
“undermine the considerable reliance that Congress and state legislatures have placed upon its 
drafting of campaign finance laws.”105 The McCutcheon Court did not exhibit the same reticence 
and calls for refined analysis of federal and state pay-to-play regulations. Pay-to-play regulations 
involve restrictions on contributions permitted by individuals contracting with the government. 
Such regulations are drafted and enacted with the goal of preventing individuals who make 
political contributions from using those contributions to gain political favor. On its face, pay-to-
play regulations appear specifically designed to prevent quid pro quo corruption. However after 
                                                          
101 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 at 1448.  
102 Id. 
103 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  
104 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
105 Id. at 234-235.  
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McCutcheon, the question presented to legislatures and court’s evaluating pay-to-play regulations 
is whether these regulations are closely drawn to meet their goal of preventing quid pro quo 
corruption. There multiple federal pay-to-play regulations, in addition to a vast array of state and 
local pay-to-play laws and ordinances. Recently, parties have challenged the federal pay-to-play 
regulations, in particular the federal contractor contribution ban and the Security and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) Political Contribution Rule. The discussion of those challenges and analysis 
of the federal and state regulations follows.  
IV:  FEDERAL PAY-TO-PLAY REGULATIONS 
Federal Contractor Ban on Contributions – 2 U.S.C. § 441c 
The Federal Contractor Ban on Contributions is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441c, and prohibits 
any “person” who contracts with the United States or any department or agencies of the United 
States from directly or indirectly making or soliciting contributions to any political party, 
committee, or candidate for public office or to any person for any political purpose or use.106 The 
regulation within FECA, that defines a “person” to include an “individual, partnership, committee, 
association, corporation labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons” other 
than the federal government.107 The regulation applies to contributions made in connection with 
federal elections, and applies only to the “person” who contracts with the government.108 Of 
particular note are the limitations of the contribution ban is specifically tailored to the party 
contracting with the government only, and allows the contracting party to establish political action 
committees that are capable of making contributions which would otherwise be unlawful under 
                                                          
106 2 U.S.C. § 441c.  
107 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a).  
108 2 U.S.C. § 431(11). 
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the regulation.109 In 2012, federal contractors challenged 2 U.S.C. § 441c in Wagner v. FEC, 
arguing that the regulation was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.110  
In Wagner, the plaintiffs alleged that the ban on political contributions to federal 
contractors violates their First Amendment rights and sought a preliminary injunction preventing 
enforcement of 2 U.S. § 441c so that they could make contributions for the 2012 election cycle.111 
As noted in Buckley, regulations affecting political contributions implicate an individual’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech and association.112 The federal contractor ban on 
contributions clearly restricts federal contractors’ First Amendment rights by prohibiting them 
from making political contributions. Thus, because the federal contractor ban limits individual’s 
First Amendment rights, the regulation must be closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption, 
and may not unnecessarily abridge First Amendment rights. Emphasizing judicial precedent, the 
district court affirmed that there is ‘no doubt that preventing “pay-to-play” deals or pressure on 
contractors to give – or the appearance that either is occurring – is sufficiently important to warrant 
restrictions on political contributions by federal contractors.”113 Simplified, it is clear to the district 
court that the contractor contribution ban was enacted to prevent quid pro quo corruption. This 
satisfies the district court’s first inquiry regarding the validity of the regulation under closely drawn 
scrutiny. The second question presented to the court is whether the regulation unnecessarily 
abridged First Amendment rights.114 
The contribution limit at issue in Buckley and McCutcheon differs significantly from the 
contribution ban at issue in Wagner. Simply put, the FECA regulation in Buckley and McCutcheon 
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is a limit upon an individual’s ability to make political contributions, whereas the federal contractor 
contribution ban is prohibition or outright restriction upon an individual’s ability to make political 
contributions. The difference between the regulations at issue in Buckley and Wagner is the scope 
of the regulation and not the degree of infringement upon First Amendment rights.115 Although an 
outright ban appears to impermissibly infringe upon First Amendment freedoms, courts prior to 
the McCutcheon decision repeatedly upheld contractor contribution bans as constitutional because 
of the close nexus between any contribution by contractors and actual or the appearance of 
corruption.   
In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,116 plaintiffs challenged Connecticut’s ban on 
contractor campaign contributions as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.117 Plaintiffs 
argued that a ban on contractor contributions is an overly broad restriction of First Amendment 
speech and therefore not closely drawn to prevent quid quo pro corruption or its appearance.118 
The Second Circuit upheld Connecticut’s ban on contractor campaign contributions in part because 
the ban was a product of corruption scandals where public officials accepted gifts from contractors 
in exchange for state contracts.119 The Second Circuit noted that a ban on contractor contributions 
may have been overbroad to meet the interest of actual corruption.120 However according to the 
Second Circuit, the recent scandals brought to light the important interest of preventing the 
appearance of corruption, and justified the ban in light of this interest.121 The D.C. Circuit in 
Wagner, followed the Second Circuit’s reasoning in upholding the validity of 2 U.S.C. § 441c, 
noting that because the ban was enacted in response to a history or evidence of corruption it passes 
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muster as closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.122 Furthermore, 
the court found that a ban on federal contractor contributions in no way stretches the imagination 
to envision that individuals might make campaign contributions to curry political favor.123 Finally, 
the court noted that “the judiciary owes special deference to legislative determinations regarding 
campaign contribution restrictions,” and stated that “there is less need for the court to interfere 
with legislative judgments where the persons affected by the ban have other meaningful avenues 
for political association and expression.124 Despite the district court’s conclusions, the reasoning 
is subject to further scrutiny in light of the McCutcheon decision and resultant analysis respecting 
regulations designed to prevent quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.  
In McCutcheon, the Supreme Court advised that absent evidence of direct quid pro quo 
corruption, the Court may regulate the appearance of corruption.125 However, the appearance of 
quid pro quo corruption is applicable only to “the narrow category of money gifts that are directed, 
in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder” that in turn provides or may provide political 
favors or access in recognition of the monetary gift.126 Critically, the Court emphasized that 
“closely drawn” scrutiny requires consideration of both the government interest balanced against 
“unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights.127 It is clear that regulation of the federal 
contractor contributions is a sufficient government interest to prevent quid pro quo corruption and 
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its appearance, the inquiry by the Wagner court after McCutcheon should be does a ban on federal 
contractor contributions unnecessarily abridge First Amendment rights. Prior to McCutcheon, the 
district court concluded the answer was no, the federal contractor contribution ban did not 
unnecessarily abridge First Amendment rights. Following the McCutcheon decision, the answer to 
that question is a resounding yes.  
In its initial decision, the D.C. Circuit found that the ban on federal contractor contributions 
was closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance relying upon (1) the history 
and evidence of corruption, (2) deference to the legislature regarding the appropriateness of 
contribution restrictions, and (3) the avenues of political association available to federal 
contractors irrespective of the ban on contributions.128 Following the McCutcheon decision, none 
of these justifications are sufficient for a finding that complete bans on federal contractor 
contributions are closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. The Wagner 
court correctly found that a history of evidence and corruption underscores the notion that federal 
contractor contribution bans satisfy a sufficient government interest. However deference to the 
legislature, evidence of corruption, and the avenues of political association outside of political 
contributions do not support the conclusion that a complete ban on contributions does not 
unnecessarily abridge First Amendment freedoms and is closely drawn to satisfy that interest. 
The Wagner court stated that when evaluating whether a regulation is closely drawn, the 
court’s duty is to “assess the proportionality of the ban to the government’s asserted interest in 
order to ensure that First Amendment freedoms are not impermissibly burdened.129 On their face, 
Federal contractor bans move toward the most restrictive means, an outright ban, without 
consideration of more stringent regulation allowing federal contractors to exercise their First 
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Amendment rights. The Wagner court states that “the threat of corruption addressed by the 
provision at issue here is far from ‘illusory,’ but instead provides a reasonable basis for restricting 
political contributions by federal contractors.”130 This statement is an example of the district 
court’s reasoning, which was valid prior to McCutcheon, but subject to revised scrutiny post-
McCutcheon. The district court relied upon the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Green Party to 
conclude that a ban on contractor contributions is consistent with the First Amendment because, 
while a proportionally drastic measure, political contributions by contractors might create a 
perception of improper influence on state officials.131 This reasoning is no longer valid following 
McCutcheon. In McCutcheon, the Court emphasized that “the First Amendment requires us to err 
on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”132 The McCutcheon Court 
emphasized that multiple alternatives are available to Congress which allow for appropriate 
regulation while simultaneously avoiding unnecessary abridgement of First Amendment 
freedoms.133 In other words, there were less restrictive means available to Congress to achieve 
their goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption. A complete ban on contributions to any official, 
candidate, or party is overly broad, and if challenged, § 441c would likely be considered an 
unnecessary infringement upon a contractor’s First Amendment rights.  
If § 441c is deemed invalid, such a finding would not preclude Congress from creating 
more specific restrictions on federal contractor contributions, but in its present form the federal 
contractor contribution ban does not pass muster under the McCutcheon analysis because it is 
unnecessarily infringes upon First Amendment rights and is not closely drawn to prevent quid pro 
quo corruption. Unlike the federal contractor contribution ban which is likely invalid following 
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the McCutcheon decision, the SEC Rule 206(4)-5 is an example of a contractor contribution ban 
that is closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption.  
SEC Rule 206(4)-5 
The SEC adopted Rule 206(4)-5 to prevent quid pro quo corruption as it relates to 
investment advisers and individuals associated with investment advisors that provide investment 
advisory services to the government.134 Rule 206(4)-5 was modelled after Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board’s (“MSRB”) Rules G-37 and G-38 that the SEC believed “significantly curbed 
pay-to-play practices in the municipal securities market.”135 The regulations do not ban 
contributions to any candidate or political party, but rather are more narrowly tailored to the 
officials which oversee or are potentially implicated in the award of the conflicting contract.136 
The SEC Rule involves five basic components: (1) a two-year ban on investment advisers 
accepting compensation for advisory services from government entities if disqualifying 
contributions are made; (2) a ban on directly or indirectly paying a third-party to solicit a 
government entity for investment advisory services; (3) a ban on soliciting or coordinating 
contributions to officials of government entities to which the investment adviser provides advisory 
services (or seeks to provide advisory services; (4) a ban on soliciting or coordinating payments to 
state or local political parties in jurisdictions where the investment adviser provides or seeks to 
provide advisory services; and (5) disclosure requirements of contributions and payments made by 
the advisor.137 Compared to the federal contractor contribution ban, the SEC Rule components are 
more specific as to whom the investment advisors (contractors) are prohibited from making 
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political contributions to. By including specific restrictions on the recipient of the contribution, the 
SEC Rule is more narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption, and would pass muster 
under McCutcheon.  
The critical distinction between the SEC Rule and the federal contractor ban is that the 
SEC Rule only proscribes activity as it relates to contributions to officials of government entities 
which the investment advisor provides advisory services, or to political parties in jurisdictions 
where the investment advisor provides services.138 The contribution restrictions are limited solely 
making contributions to officials or individuals that can influence the award of the government 
advisory contract.139 Conversely, the federal contractor contribution ban prohibits contributions to 
any political party, candidate, or elected official in the federal government; irrespective of whether 
or not that the recipient of the contribution may have influence or effect on the award of the federal 
contract. Thus, the SEC Rule, while limiting exercise of certain First Amendment Rights, is 
narrowly tailored to address direct quid pro quo corruption by proscribing donations between the 
contractor and the specific politicians or officials which may award the contract.140 Beyond the 
federal regulations addressing contractor contributions and pay-to-play, multiple states have 
enacted comparable legislation to combat the threat of corruption in the award of government 
contracts. One example is the New Jersey pay-to-play regulation, which is discussed and analyzed 
in the following section.  
 
V:  NEW JERSEY STATE PAY-TO-PLAY REGULATIONS 
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 Governor James McGreevy introduced New Jersey pay-to-play regulations in 2004, 
issuing Executive Order No. 134. The Executive Order, later codified as N.J.S.A. 19:44A-20.4 
provides that:  
[a] county, or any agency thereof, shall not enter into a contract having an 
anticipated value in excess of $17,500, as determined in advance and certified in 
writing by the county, agency or instrumentality, with a business entity, except a 
contract that is awarded pursuant to a fair and open process, if, during the preceding 
one-year period, that business entity has made a contribution that is reportable by 
the recipient under P.L. 1973, c.83 (C.19:44A-1 et seq.), to any county committee 
of a political party in that county if a member of that political party is serving in an 
elective public office of that county when the contract is awarded or to any 
candidate committee of any person serving in an elective public office of that 
county when the contract is awarded, and  
 A business entity that has entered into a contract having an anticipated value 
in excess of $17,500 with a county, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, except 
a contract that is awarded pursuant to a fair and open process, shall not make such 
a contribution, reportable by the recipient under P.K. 1973, c. 83 (C. 19:44A-1 et 
sq.), to any county committee of a political party in that county if a member of that 
political party is serving in an elective public office of that county when the contract 
is awarded or any candidate committee of any person serving in an elective public 
office of that county when the contract is awarded, during the term of that 
contract.141  
 
Of note, the New Jersey regulation proscribes entities holding contracts in excess of $17,500 from 
making contributions over $300 to any county committee of a political party if the party is serving 
in elective office where the contract was awarded.142 In enacting the regulation, the New Jersey 
State Senate stated that the purpose of the bill was to “reduce the risk of actual or perceived 
corruption”, and emphasized that such corruption may result from elected officials that award (or 
control the award) of the contract receiving contributions from business entities holding or seeking 
government contracts.143 The constitutionality of the regulation was challenged in New Jersey v. 
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Soto144, wherein the New Jersey Appellate Division upheld a prohibition on contributions by 
casino employees.145 In upholding the pay-to-play regulation, the Appellate Division applied the 
Buckley test, requiring (1) a compelling state interest; and (2) that the regulation be sufficiently 
narrow and rationally related to the state interest.146 As discussed in this note, the Supreme Court 
reformed the standard applicable to campaign contribution regulations in McCutcheon, requiring 
that the regulation (1) be enacted to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance in the sphere 
of government contracting, and (2) is closely drawn to meet that goal.147 Thus, if a party challenged 
the New Jersey regulations following the McCutcheon decision, would they pass muster as being 
closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption?  
The regulations, on their face, appear narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption 
by proscribing contributions from contractors to individuals that directly affect the award of the 
state contract.148 Particularly, the regulations restrict contributions when an individual makes a 
contribution to officials, committees, candidates or political parties that control award of the 
contract, or serve in a district where the contract is being awarded.149 Unlike the aggregate limits 
deemed overly broad in McCutcheon, preventing contributions from contractors to individuals or 
entities that are positioned to directly affect the award of the contract implicates direct quid pro 
quo corruption and is likely not an overly broad restriction on First Amendment speech. Thus, 
New Jersey’s state pay-to-play regulations would likely pass muster under the McCutcheon 
analysis.  
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While New Jersey imposes pay-to-play regulations at the state level, four counties in New 
Jersey and 170 municipalities also enacted pay-to-play laws.150 Following the McCutcheon, each 
of these regulations may be subject to scrutiny by individuals seeking to make political 
contributions and warrants analysis.  
Atlantic County 
 Atlantic County’s pay-to-play ordinance closely mirrors the state pay-to-play regulation, 
but expands the scope of that regulation beyond the constitutional means justified in 
McCutcheon.151 Specifically, the ordinance imposes a $2,500 aggregate contribution limit on 
contracting entities for contributions to “all candidates for elective County office and to 
officeholders with ultimate responsibility for award of the contract, and all County and state 
political parties, municipal party committees within Atlantic County and PACs.”152 Furthermore, 
the ordinance prohibits the county from entering into a contract with a professional business entity 
that has made a contribution in the preceding calendar year to one of the above-mentioned political 
bodies.153  
 Application of the McCutcheon ruling clearly invalidates the $2,500 aggregate contribution 
limit on contracting entities. The analysis in McCutcheon requires (1) prevention of quid pro quo 
corruption, and (2) regulation closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption. The Atlantic 
County regulation’s prohibition on contributions to all county and state political parties, and all 
municipal party committees within Atlantic County would likely be considered overly broad 
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restrictions that do not address quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.154 The New Jersey pay-
to-play regulation prohibits contributions to office holders or candidates that directly control or 
affect the award of the state contract.155 The Atlantic County ordinance expands upon the 
contribution prohibition to include all county and state political parties and all municipal 
committees within Atlantic County. This expansion, absent evidence to suggest actual quid pro 
quo corruption does not satisfy the closely drawn standard. It is difficult to consider that 
contributions to state or municipal party committees prevent quid pro quo corruption as it relates 
to a contract awarded by a county or its departments. One may argue that state or municipal 
committees influence the award of contracts, however the Supreme Court emphasized that the First 
Amendment forces us to err on the side of protecting individuals rights.156 As noted in 
McCutcheon, “there is a clear, administrable line between money beyond the base limits funneled 
in an identifiable way to a candidate-for which the candidate feels obligated-and money within the 
base limits given widely to a candidate’s party—for which the candidate, like all other members 
of the party, feel grateful.”157 Aggregate limits on contributions to municipal, county and state 
party committees are distinguishable from the base limits on contributions to the officials, 
officeholders, or candidates which have responsibility for award of the contract and thus likely fail 
to satisfy the McCutcheon closely drawn standard.  
Bergen County 
Bergen County’s pay-to-play ordinance provides a one-year prohibition on contractor 
contributions to any candidate for county-wide elective office or holder of elective office in Bergen 
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County.158 Furthermore, Bergen County imposes both base and aggregate limits on the amount a 
contracting entity may make to county-wide elective office or office holders, and an additional 
base limit on contributions to county political parties.159  
Bergen County’s pay-to-play laws proscription on contributions to candidates for elective 
office or holders of elective office in Bergen County could likely be substantiated as a measure 
preventing actual quid pro quo corruption. The aggregate limits, while invalid in McCutcheon, are 
presumptively valid in Bergen County because the ordinance limits the aggregate contribution 
limits to county-wide elective offices or office holders, or the individuals who may be directly 
implicated in award of a county contract.160 The Bergen County ordinance’s prohibition on 
contribution to county-wide offices or office holders is distinct from Atlantic County’s prohibition 
on contributions to all state and municipal party committees. Under McCutcheon, the Bergen 
County ordinance appears closely to prohibit actual quid pro quo corruption because it targets 
contribution limits for officials and offices directly awarding or capable of influencing the award 
of contracts only.  
Monmouth County 
 Monmouth County adopted the state pay-to-play legislation codified at N.J.S.A. 19:44A-
1.161 Monmouth County’s regulations are identical to the state pay-to-play legislation. As 
previously discussed, New Jersey’s pay-to-play regulations likely pass muster under the 
McCutcheon analysis because the regulations prohibit contributions from contractors to the 
politicians or individuals that are able to influence the award of the government contracts. 
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Therefore, because Monmouth County’s regulations are identical to the state pay-to-play 
regulations, Monmouth County’s regulations would pass muster if challenged.  
VI:  INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ON FEDERAL ELECTIONS AND 
THE AWARD OF FEDERAL CONTRACTS 
  
A 2011 study examined the success of corporations in securing government contracts 
through campaign donations.162 The researcher conducted case studies of two instances of 
politically motivated contracts — one related to the Iraq war and the other with Hurricane Katrina 
— and analyzed data from 367 firms with corporate PACs active between 1979 and 2006 across a 
variety of industries. The study determined that for each additional $201,220 in campaign 
contributions, a firm could expect to receive an additional 107 contracts on average. This translates 
into roughly $5,300,000 in additional revenues.163 These examples clearly demonstrate, at a 
minimum, a correlation between campaign contributions and the award of federal contracts. At 
worst, it indicates that money not only buys access, but influences contract award decisions and 
firm profits.164  
 According to the FEC, a record-breaking $7 billion was spent on federal elections in 
2012.165 Critics of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United and McCutcheon attribute the 
record breaking amount of money in federal elections to the departure from regulations limiting 
corporate expenditures and aggregate limits on individual contributions.166 Analysis of 
successfully Congressional races is an instructive example of the potential effect of the 
McCutcheon decision. The Center for Responsive Politics found that in 2012, the average winner 
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of a Congressional race spent $1.5 million.167 The McCutcheon decision eliminated the $123,200 
per cycle cap on individual donations to federal candidates.168 Thus, following the decision, 
individual donors are capable of giving up to $3.5 million each cycle to all federal candidates, 
PACs and political parties.169 Assuming the average winner of a Congressional race needs to spend 
approximately $1.5-2 million; one wealthy donor could theoretically fund two winning 
Congressional candidates.170 Taking the numbers a step further, Democrats and Republicans raised 
$1.5 billion for Congressional races in 2010; thus, 429 donors, each donating the $1.5 million 
maximum post McCutcheon could fund the winning candidates in the 2010 election.171 In other 
words, if the aggregate limits were struck down prior to the 2010 election, 429 individuals could 
have theoretically funded every winning Congressional candidate.  
While it is unlikely that 429 individuals will control the outcome of every federal election 
in 2016, the example above elucidates that at the very least McCutcheon will increase the amount 
of money in politics, and enables donors with deeper pockets to exert influence through political 
contributions that the average voter is unable to. In the 2012 election, 28% of all disclosed political 
contributions came from 31,385 individuals.172 This equates to approximately one ten-thousandth 
of the U.S. population making over a quarter of the political contributions for the 2012 election.173 
The gap between the average voting citizen and citizens exerting political influence will only 
widen following the McCutcheon decision. The effect of the decision is not limited to federal 
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politics, but will trickle down to the state level as state legislatures review and revise their pay-to-
play legislation to comport with the McCutcheon decision.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in McCutcheon struck down the aggregate campaign 
contribution limits in FECA. In McCutcheon, the Court determined that aggregate campaign 
contribution limits do not combat the valid constitutional interest of preventing quid pro quo 
corruption and therefore fail to satisfy the closely drawn scrutiny standard. This Note argues that 
applying the McCutcheon analysis has widespread effect on federal and state regulations 
addressing campaign contributions, specifically, the Federal Contractor Contribution ban and 
several of New Jersey’s county’s pay-to-play regulations would not survive a First Amendment 
challenge following application of the McCutcheon analysis. The remaining issue is whether the 
legal effect of the McCutcheon decision will have practical implications.174 For example, if the 
Federal Contractor Contribution ban is deemed unconstitutional, federal contractors would be 
permitted to make political contributions for the first time in forty years. The effect of removing 
but the studies of campaign finance and political contracts shed some light on the possible result.  
While many researchers agree that contributions do not influence decision-making via quid 
pro quo, there is evidence to support the conclusion that contributions help organized interests gain 
access to and develop friendly relations with Congress members, which sometimes brings tangible 
benefits. Firms donating more money have a greater ability to form relationships and, perhaps, 
receive more contracts.”175 After McCutcheon, the maximum individual contribution to a federal 
candidate currently is $2,600 per election, with the primary and general counting as separate 
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elections, for a total of $5,200 per candidate during a single two-year election cycle. But in the 
absence of an overall cap on spending, the donor could, in theory, well over a million dollars before 
running out of federal candidates and committees to support.176  
With evidence to support the conclusion that contributions not only increase political 
influence, but lead to greater financial benefits, the Court’s decision in McCutcheon will likely 
have far reaching implications on the already muddled area of campaign finance regulation. In the 
short term, the decision enables deep pockets to exert increased influence in federal elections and 
on the award of government contract – the long term effects, only time will tell.  
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